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Questions of the United Nations’s “relevance” in the 21st century officially became fair game
during President Bush’s September 2002 speech to the body’s General Assembly in the
contentious run-up to the Iraq War, and grew to a crescendo in 2005 with publication of the
organization’s plans for reform. Yet, as a new Secretary-General of the United Nations takes
the helm following the tumultuous and certainly historic decade of Kofi Annan, these
questions—and their answers—have hardly been exhausted, and the successes, failures, and
future of the organization remain the subject of animated debate. Two recent books seek to
both reflect and contribute to the discussion, and together constitute an authoritative, albeit
greatly imbalanced, insight into the UN’s standing and status as it enters its 62nd year.
Paul Kennedy’s The Parliament of Man: The United Nations and the Quest for World
Government, is the clear lightweight in both substance and style. A seemingly ambitious
work, titled as it is after a line in Alfred Tennyson famous “Locksley Hall” and divided into
three parts on the body’s origins, evolution, and future, its length is glaringly insufficient,
while only its first part, itself a mere 48 pages, stands up to scrutiny. This part is, however, as
solid an overview of the UN’s intellectual and political origins as one will find, beginning in
the 19th century and including a lucid analysis of how the failure of the League of Nations
and the utterly determinative Second World War led to and influenced the UN’s formation.
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2Indeed, the almost total extent to which the organization’s structure and composition,
numerous purposes, and—with the benefit of hindsight—inherent limitations were the
product of a World War II political and economic paradigm, is a fact that today’s pundits and
critics would do well to remember.
Not only was the Security Council created by and for its permanent five ‘victorious’ Allied
nations, but the notoriously contentious veto power invested in them was introduced as the
only way to keep the US and USSR—defeaters of, in the Charter’s words, the “enemy states”
of Germany and Japan—on-board. National and economic security were not only paramount
concerns (with human rights and development secondary and relegated to the General
Assembly), but vote distribution in the IMF and World Bank was heavily weighted in favor
of the (capitalist) nations best placed to resurrect global markets in the aftermath of the war.
Most UN agencies (UNICEF, the Food and Agricultural Organization, etc), seen in the light
of post-war “reconstruction,” were not envisaged as having long life-spans. Peacekeeping,
probably the issue most often identified with the UN today, was, in the wake of a war fought
between rather than within states, not envisaged at all. And who takes the time to consider
that, due to firm official acceptance of colonialism in 1945, there were only a wieldy 50
member states in the first General Assembly (compared to the then-inconceivable and often
unwieldy 192 by 2006)?
It is when Kennedy, a Professor of History at Yale, moves beyond this historical perspective
and into the chapters on various UN operations and initiatives, however, that his work begins
to founder. Affording far too little space for this ambitious number of “many UNs,” he
resorts to descriptions and explanations so brief and/or general as to be either quantitatively
inadequate or conclusory. In claiming, for example, that many of the UN’s human rights
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Namibia or Mozambique without the world organization?” Yet his entire previous treatment
of the matter (three chapters earlier no less) is simply that “A transition assistance group
(UNTAG) successfully supervised Namibia’s move to independence. With internal peace
also coming to Mozambique, the Security Council could establish observers there
(ONUMOZ) as the democratic process began.”
Moreover, Kennedy compounds the situation by increasingly choosing to ‘cover’ an entire
subject area, the UN’s humanitarian and development agendas for example, with one or more
case-studies—themselves tending toward brevity and lack of analysis—on an individual
agency or operation. He does on occasion draw some interesting insights: the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights was adopted unanimously in 1948 when nearly three-quarters
of the UN’s present members were either non-existent or disenfranchised, and the IMF’s
failure in Mexico in 1982 is analogous to Peacekeeping’s failures the following decade in
Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda. Yet, the sum of these parts remains disproportionately small
to the scope of these chapters. The last, potentially the book’s most interesting for its focus
on the relationship between non-governmental organizations and the UN, also miscarries as
the author gets buried in the details of the media’s international networks and the like, while
his point, not entirely clear to begin with, gets lost.
The book’s final part on the reform of the UN and its future challenges is particularly
disappointing, not least because it signals yet further and untenable “mission creep’ in the
book’s scope, but also in view of Kennedy’s qualifications to expound upon this subject,
having served on an international commission in 1995 designed for the same purpose. Other
than taking on an optimistic tone and coming out firmly in the ‘still relevant’ camp in the
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speculation and non-committal and cliché-riddled in its conclusions. One almost wonders
whether such was drafted by a student assistant, rather than by an author with the experience
and expertise at Kennedy’s disposal. And even more so than in the book’s previous chapters,
the prose is often awkwardly unsophisticated: “In all these dimensions of our lives, we must
indeed all hang together or, most assuredly, we will hang separately … Would Russia agree
to a Japanese veto? Hmn.”
Thus, on its own, The Parliament of Man—save for its excellent first part—is at best a weak
outline of the UN’s past, present, and future. As an opening act, however, which at least
identifies most elements and aspects of the UN, it does at least prepare the reader for the
more narrowly focused and forcefully written headliner.
James Traub’s The Best Intentions: Kofi Annan and the UN in the Era of American World
Power assumes a place among the very best of the many books on humanitarianism (broadly
defined) that have lined the shelves in recent years, and that it sometimes recalls: William
Shawcross’s Deliver Us from Evil, David Reiff’s A Bed for the Night, Linda Polman’s We
Did Nothing. Biography of an outgoing Secretary-General, history of modern peacekeeping
operations, and analysis of the UN-US relationship in equal and seamlessly woven parts, the
book presents a fair and balanced account of the record on these subjects while still
managing—nearly always through a dispassionate but deftly sequenced presentation of
facts—to pull no punches. Such clearly demands that the author draw upon his
professionalism and expertise as a journalist for The New York Times Magazine, for as he
freely confesses, he “likes” both Annan and the UN. What emerges is less an overall
conclusion—the nature of which, beyond a clear echoing (if for different reasons) of Richard
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than a series of individual multi-part and/or mixed verdicts. Annan is generally acquitted,
though is a much-diminished figure by the book’s final pages; peacekeeping is generally
convicted; the UN-US relationship is left essentially undecided.
Between summer 2004 and fall 2005, Traub had unprecedented, if not unfettered, access to
Annan in New York and in his missions abroad, both as quiet public observer and private
conversationalist. Literally and figuratively, they covered a lot of ground. Traub uses the
Gulf War of 1991 as his point of departure, expressly to show the favorable context in which
Annan’s appointment as Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations the
following year took place, as the “planets in the UN system were perfectly aligned” for the
successful Charter-based intervention in Iraq. Implicitly, Traub book-ends his work with Iraq
and paints a contrast between a war in which President George H.W. Bush ardently sought
UN support and approval, and the one in 2003 that so divided the UN and the current
President Bush.
The rest of the book leaves nothing of any importance from Annan’s agendas in
Peacekeeping and as Secretary-General unaddressed, and does so through a narrative that is
at once chronological, coherent, and creative. It is also riddled—thanks to Traub’s privileged
perspective—with the sort of anecdotes that allows the book to be a bridge between the
strictly academic and the popular; its prose is intellectual and serious but readily accessible.
The accounts of Annan’s controversial diplomacy with Saddam Hussein in Iraq (bizarre),
Senator Jesse Helms’ visit to the UN (amusing), the death of 22 UN staff in Baghdad
(harrowing), and of the tense all-night negotiations on UN reform (edifying) come to mind.
The several chapters on the Oil-for-Food scandal, in addition to containing many useful
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accurate, balanced, and complete retelling of the drama yet, and so constitute, perhaps even
more-so than the rest of the book, a unique contribution to the discourse on UN management
and reform.
The book—and Annan himself—is at once at its strongest and weakest in the passages on
“the responsibility to protect”, a doctrine holding that sovereign states have such a
responsibility toward their citizens, and that in the event states refuse or fail to accept it, such
shifts to the international community. While Annan expressed almost no public regret over
his weak Peacekeeping leadership during the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, he began
advocating this “responsibility to protect” in a speech in the spring of 1998 in the context of
Milosevic’s Kosovo, a year before NATO began its bombing campaign there. Two things are
clear (and presented as such by Traub): One, that Annan countenanced armed intervention by
the international community as an acceptable means of exercising this responsibility, but that,
Two, such could only be made legitimate by a Security Council resolution. Also made clear
by Traub is that, as the bombing got underway without such a resolution, Annan changed his
mind; he supported and even saw as legitimate—pursuant not to the UN Charter but to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights—the intervention.
However, as Annan again shifted back, finally settling on a circular position of wanting it
both ways—the UN’s legitimacy resting on the responsibility to protect, with that
responsibility’s legitimacy resting with the UN—Traub explains this far less than he might,
instead asking the reader to connect the dots among various events and developments. Such
requires some rereading to do so. Yet, if this section captures Annan in both his inspiring
7moral leadership and his characteristic indecision, it is exceptional to Traub’s otherwise clear
account.
It also serves as an introduction to the chapters on the responsibility to protect’s most recent
application: Darfur. That genocide in western Sudan was occurring at the time of the book’s
writing and continues to the present day, gives these chapters an eerie relevance. It also
leaves the reader wondering—to no fault of Traub—whether this most important piece of
Annan’s legacy will be brought to bear in the wake of his departure, and in a context all too
reminiscent of Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo.
While Traub joins Kennedy in taking the view that the UN remains every bit as relevant
today as it was upon its founding, perhaps he would prefer to withhold his final judgment
until more time affords both a deeper perspective on Annan’s efforts and an end-game in
Darfur. What is sure is the relevance—and excellence—of The Best Intentions, the second of
two unequal parts to a mixed situation report for the UN at the end of the Kofi Annan era.
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